

A247 953

STUDY PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: THE ROAD TO SUCCESS


BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRISTOPHER R. WELLWOOD
Canadian Forces

DTIC
SELECTED
MAR 25 1992

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1992



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

92-07450

Best Available Copy

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS			
b. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			
b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION			
7c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Root Hall, Building 122 Carlisle, PA 17013-5050		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER			
10c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS			
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)

United Nations Peacekeeping: The Road to Success

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

Wellwood, Christopher R., COL, Canadian Forces

13a. TYPE OF REPORT Study Project	13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 13 February 1992	15. PAGE COUNT 37
--------------------------------------	--	---	----------------------

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES	18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

The level of success of the twenty United Nations peacekeeping operations conducted since the end of World War II has varied considerably. Some missions were successful, while others were failures, and yet others have perhaps become part of the problem. The author uses three case studies to determine the optimum climate for a successful peacekeeping operation: the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Emergency Force II. While these operations were all conducted within a few hundred kilometers of each other, the effectiveness of each was strikingly different. The lessons learned from them apply to peacekeeping operations now under consideration in New York and to operations that will be planned in the future. The author identifies four critical factors in the formula for success: the agreement and cooperation of the belligerents, the drafting of the mandate, freedom of movement and the financial arrangements.

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS	21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL DOUGLAS H. DEARTH	22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (717) 245-3191
	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCD

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING:

THE ROAD TO SUCCESS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Christopher R. Wellwood
Canadian Forces

Douglas H. Dearth
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	11
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	11
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CASE ONE: UNIFIL.....	5
CASE TWO: UNFICYP.....	10
CASE THREE: UNEF II.....	15
CONCLUSION.....	18
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	24
ENDNOTES.....	27
ANNEX A - UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS 1947 TO PRESENT.....	29
ANNEX B - MAP OF UNIFIL MISSION AREA 1985.....	31
ANNEX C - MAP OF UNFICYP MISSION AREA POST-1974.....	32
ANNEX D - MAP OF UNEF II MISSION AREA 1979.....	33
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	34

Accession For	
NTIS GRAFI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unpublished	<input type="checkbox"/>
Journal Article	<input type="checkbox"/>
Priority	
Distribution	
Availability Index	
Serial and/or	
Dist	Special

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Christopher R. Wellwood, Col, Canadian Forces

TITLE: United Nations Peacekeeping: The Road to Success

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 13 February 1992 **PAGES:** 37 **CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

The level of success of the twenty United Nations peacekeeping operations conducted since the end of World War II has varied considerably. Some missions were successful, while others were failures, and yet others have perhaps become part of the problem. The author uses three case studies to determine the optimum climate for a successful peacekeeping operation: the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Emergency Force II. While these operations were all conducted within a few hundred kilometres of each other, the effectiveness of each was strikingly different. The lessons learned from them apply to peacekeeping operations now under consideration in New York and to operations that will be planned in the future. The author identifies four critical factors in the formula for success: the agreement and cooperation of the belligerents, the drafting of the mandate, freedom of movement and the financial arrangements.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The maps at Annexes B and D are reproduced with the kind permission of the Publications Board of the United Nations, and are originally found in The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, United Nations, New York, 1985.

The author would like to acknowledge Major-General Clive Milner, OMM, CD, Force Commander, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, Nicosia and Mr Joachim Hutter, a senior executive in the office of the Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs at the United Nations Headquarters, New York, for their contributions to this research paper.

Special acknowledgement is given to Major-General Gunther G. Greindl, Austrian Army, previous Force Commander, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, previous Force Commander, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and current Chief Military Observer, United Nations Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission, not only for the information gleaned from speeches that he has given to audiences around the world, but also for his tutelage in the art of peacekeeping.

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING:
THE ROAD TO SUCCESS

The will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a course. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Quarantine the Aggressors Speech
Chicago, October 5, 1937

INTRODUCTION

From Pakistan to Palestine, from the Sinai desert to the Honduran jungle, eleven thousand men and women wearing the United Nations blue beret are currently placing themselves in personal peril for the good of the world, national interests other than the peaceful resolution of conflict being put aside. Hundreds have given their lives in the service of peace. Ever since the Canadian Minister of External Affairs Lester B. Pearson and Secretary General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjold worked out a formula enabling the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the Suez and the positioning of multi-national forces to ensure the safety of the Canal in 1956, the United Nations has been involved in the growth industry of peacekeeping, of providing a climate in which nations or opposing factions could find diplomatic rather than military solutions to their disagreements.

The level of success of the twenty United Nations peacekeeping

operations to date has varied. For instance the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), on the Israel-Egypt border from November 1956 until its eviction by Egyptian President Gamal Nasser in June 1967, was less successful than UNEF II which succeeded it from October 1972 until July 1979. The United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC) from July 1960 to June 1964 was more successful than the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was established in 1978. Why were some missions successful while others were failures? Why did some operations stabilize the situation, while others had no effect whatsoever? This paper will attempt to determine, by the historical study of three United Nations peacekeeping operations, the optimum climate for successful future peacekeeping missions. The original causes of the conflict, the economic and internal political situations of the belligerents and the cultural differences of the opposing factions, although effecting the success or failure of peacekeeping operations, will not be discussed here.

The concept of peacekeeping pre-dates the United Nations. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 was the first attempt to create a "New World Order" in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, while World Wars I and II led to the creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations, respectively. The League of Nations Covenant stated:

"it shall be the duty of the council in such cases to recommend to the several governments concerned what the effective Military, Naval or Air Force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."

The League deployed forces in peacekeeping roles in the Vilna area in 1920, in the Upper Amazon in 1933-34 and to maintain order in the Saar between the Germans and the French in 1934. These three intervention forces were never called upon to use armed force, their presence alone preventing the outbreak of hostilities.

At the conclusion of World War II, the signatories of the United Nations Charter were determined to provide their organization with the capacity for conflict resolution, by force if necessary. Article 42 of the United Nations Charter states in part:

"may take such action by air, sea and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."³

Direct United Nations involvement in Korea in 1950 was only possible because the Soviet Union was absent from the Security Council for the vote on multi-national intervention. It became obvious, because of the national and international interests of the permanent members of the Security Council, that direct intervention by the United Nations would not work in future; and the concept of third-party involvement in conflict resolution was established.

Peacekeeping has come to mean an operation to help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict through peaceful third-party intervention under international direction.⁴ The International Peace Academy, a New York-based non-governmental organization affiliated with the United Nations and regional organizations, defines peacekeeping as;

"the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states through the medium of third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational military, police and civilian personnel to restore and maintain peace."⁵

It must be remembered that peacekeeping operations are just the highly visible part of the very complex process of military, diplomatic and political efforts in the attempt to resolve such hostilities. The "Blue Berets" can only provide the military stability required for the diplomatic resolution of the conflict; they cannot resolve the issue themselves. Usually these soldiers and policemen are provided from the smaller nations, which in addition to desiring a more peaceful world, hope to gain a degree of influence in world affairs by their participation; while the superpowers and other permanent members of the Security Council, who are often involved either directly or indirectly in the conflict, seldom participate in a United Nations force because of this perceived lack of impartiality. With the breakup of the Soviet Union and all the international ramifications of that event, the future participation by American or Russian troops is possible. The present Force Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus would welcome such participation and foresees some of the five permanent members of the Security Council being represented on any future peacekeeping mission in Cambodia.⁶

CASE ONE: UNIFIL

Conflict in the Middle East has deep roots, and the troubles in Lebanon are no exception. Lebanon had been used as a base of operations for Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) raids into Israel, and one such raid near Tel Aviv on March 11, 1978 resulted in 37 Israeli deaths and 76 Israeli wounded.⁷ The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) retaliated on the night of 14/15 March by conducting Operation "Litani" which resulted in their capture of southern Lebanon. Their stated intention was the eradication of the PLO bases in that area; but their secondary aim was assumed to be the expansion of their area of control,⁸ thereby providing increased security to the inhabitants of northern Israel. Although Lebanon protested to the Security Council about the Israeli invasion, the IDF continued its northerly advance, gaining as much land as possible on the assumption that it would eventually be pressured by the international community to withdraw from some of the captured territory.

Prime Minister Begin was to attend Camp David talks at the end of March and it was considered important by the Security Council that he not have the additional pressures of a war on his northern border at this critical time.⁹ Thus, on 19 March the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established with a mandate to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to restore international peace and security and to assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.¹⁰ Due to the need for haste in establishing the force, no

military advice was sought in drafting the Security Council resolution, which would later become the mandate of the force. Swedes, Iranians and Canadians transferred from other peacekeeping missions were the first to arrive; and the Force Commander, Ghanaian Major-General E.A. Erskine, saw his tasks as to:

1. Prevent the Israelis carrying out any further hostile action on Lebanese territory;
2. Confirm the Israeli withdrawal from the area;
3. Restore peace and security;
4. Assist the Lebanese government in establishing its authority in the area;
5. Prevent the recurrence of fighting; and
6. Ensure that the area was not used for hostile activities of any kind.¹¹

Erskine had neither the means nor the authority to fulfill his first, third, fifth and sixth tasks, as UN forces are allowed to fire weapons only in self defence, and only the threat of massive force could have convinced the factions to desist from further hostile activities.

Erskine's fourth task assumed a competent, working government in Beirut as UN forces, since the West Irian mission in 1963, have been precluded from assuming responsibility for administering sovereign states.¹² All the above tasks assumed the full cooperation of the governments of Israel and Lebanon and also of Syria, which had troops in the area employed with the Arab League-sanctioned Arab Deterrent Force. Cooperation by the PLO was also a necessary ingredient; but the Security Council had not mentioned that organization as a party to the conflict, and Erskine was

required to secure Chairman Arafat's pledge of cooperation after the fact. The accomplishment of the second task was potentially feasible but depended entirely on the full cooperation of the Israelis and of the other factions in the area. Another factor which complicated the task of UNIFIL was the number of armed sectarian elements in southern Lebanon which were not controlled by any government. Some of these de facto forces were aligned with Israel and others with the PLO. Each had its own agenda.

The third major difficulty was the lack of precision in the definition of the area of operations. The map at Annex B shows the mission area in 1985. Resolution 425 referred only to southern Lebanon, and the PLO believed that Israel benefitted from this vague definition. Arafat therefore demanded that Israel withdraw immediately and unconditionally. After extensive consultations it was decided that UNIFIL would occupy the IDF-held areas; but this too was unworkable because of PLO, leftist Muslim and Lebanese Christian militia enclaves located within the IDF-captured area south of the Litani. When Israel did withdraw from the area, its surrogate, a local militia force, remained in place. Israel had obeyed the Security Council resolution in fact but not in spirit.

The physical deployment of UNIFIL also caused problems. The headquarters was established in Naqoura, within a Christian-controlled area; and its safety, freedom of movement and ability to keep the peace were continually threatened by the Christian militia. The Muslim Iranian peacekeepers were deployed in the Shi'a Muslim area, while the Irish and French were stationed in the

Christian areas.¹³ The Force would have been perceived to be more impartial to all concerned if the religious affiliations of the UN soldiers had been taken into consideration in the deployment of the force. Impartiality means that the peacekeeping soldiers have no apparent or perceived interest in seeing the moral vindication or material triumph of either of the disputants.¹⁴ It took several months for the force to arrive in toto, and even then there was considerable shuffling of national contingents and battalions throughout the Force's area. The Senegalese, Nigerians and French changed sectors, while the Canadians, Iranians, and Nigerians withdrew from the Force. This lack of continuity must have had a detrimental effect on operational effectiveness as the Force Commander could not develop a relationship with the national contingents, and the belligerents could neither develop the respect for nor the trust of the peacekeepers. This lack of respect has been demonstrated by the number of UNIFIL peacekeepers who continue to be shot at or killed by the various factions in the area.

It took three years to arrange a cease-fire, which was followed by nearly a year of fragile peace in the area. In June of 1982 Israel invaded once again on Operation "Peace for Galilee" and bypassed or over-ran the UNIFIL positions, the peacekeepers having no mandate and little capacity to deal with such a situation; and when the fighting ended, the Force found itself situated within the IDF zone of occupation. A lack of cooperation by the Israelis resulted in the Force still being unable to accomplish its mandate; and a new non-UN multi-national force of American, French and

Italian troops entered Lebanon to take its turn at bat. The lack of respect that peacekeepers, UN-sponsored or otherwise, have in the UNIFIL area of operations was again demonstrated by the bombing of the American Marine barracks in 1983 and the tragic loss of American lives. Peacekeepers cannot become engaged in, or be perceived to be engaged in partisan activities or operations. The Americans effectively took the Christian Militia side during the Battle of Souk el-Gharb, becoming an active participant in the war, and thereby lost their credibility and the respect of the belligerents. The French contingent's headquarters was also bombed, once again emphasizing an essential characteristic of peacekeepers - impartiality. This force failed to achieve any noticeable success in its efforts to restore normalcy to Lebanon and subsequently withdrew in 1984.¹⁵

While UNIFIL has had some success in Lebanon, these accomplishments have not been in their mandated area of responsibility. After the IDF withdrawal, the Force and other United Nations agencies cleaned up the rubble, re-opened schools, rebuilt towns, delivered water and food, provided medical services and buried the dead. In balance, however, the citizenry of southern Lebanon have benefitted very little from the UNIFIL presence. Rubble removal cannot compare with the right and ability to live in peace and security. The Israeli invasion of 1982 radically altered the circumstances under which UNIFIL had been set up and under which it had functioned since 1978, but the Force remains in location today to provide protection and humanitarian

assistance to the local population to the extent possible.¹⁶

CASE TWO: UNFICYP

The history of Cyprus is replete with violence and invasions, from the ancient Greeks 3300 years ago, through the Assyrians and the Romans, to the Turks in 1974. After World War II the Cypriots, of both Greek and Turkish origin, began to crave political change. The Greek-Cypriot organization EOKA under General George Grivas waged guerilla warfare against the British from 1956 to 1959 and fought for union with Greece, known as Enosis.¹⁸ At the same time, the Turkish-Cypriots desired a separate Muslim state, a movement called Takim. In 1960 Cyprus was granted independence from Britain, but the new republic was formed under a constitution which was acceptable to neither ethnic community. The Treaty of Guarantee signed by Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom forbade Enosis or Takim and guaranteed the island's independence. This allowed a short respite in the violence which marks Cypriot history; but law and order soon broke down and countryman fought countryman once more over their political future.

By 21 December 1963 the violence had degenerated into open civil war.¹⁹ The three guarantor powers were unable to agree on how to resolve the problem, and the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots were unwilling to retreat from their respective demands of Enosis and Takim. The Greek-Cypriot led government soon felt threatened by Turkey and invited the Guarantors to meet to resolve the issue. The London Conference in January 1964 brought together

the two Cypriot communities, while the Guarantors attempted to find an acceptable solution. The United Kingdom recommended that a peacekeeping force with contingents from NATO countries be formed to re-establish peace. President Makarios rejected the British proposal but did agree to a UN peacekeeping force on the condition that neither Greece nor Turkey were represented.²⁰

Makarios wanted the Force's mandate to be the protection of Cypriot territorial integrity and the United Nations Force to assist the Cypriot forces in restoring the status quo. This would of course be an expression of Cypriot sovereignty and independence and could be seen to argue against the validity of the Treaty of Guarantee which gave the three signatories the right to unilaterally intervene in Cyprus to preserve the security of that nation. Thus any intervention by Turkey would be an act of international aggression under the provisions of the UN Charter. Article 103 of the Charter provides that the obligations of UN members under the Charter prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement.²¹

Security Council Resolution S/5575 was passed, and on March 16, 1964 the advance party of a Canadian infantry battalion disembarked at Nicosia International Airport. This was the first contingent of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to arrive on the island; and after the arrival of several other nations' contingents, the Force became operational on 27 March. The mandate of the Force was to preserve international peace and security, to use its efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting

and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and return to normal conditions.²²

The contingents were deployed around the island with boundaries which coincided with the political administrative boundaries. This greatly facilitated the negotiations carried out between the UNFICYP officers and the local authorities, in both the government and the Turkish-Cypriot community. Officers had to deal with only one bureaucracy on each side rather than with several offices or factions as was the case in Lebanon.

Although UNFICYP had been guaranteed freedom of movement throughout the island, this was never forthcoming. Both the Turkish Army contingent, on the island under the Treaty of Guarantee, and the government have denied the peacekeepers access to areas under their respective control on the premise of operational security concerns. This lack of freedom of movement, so necessary to fulfill the mandate, remains to this day on both the Turkish and governments sides of the "Green Line". In fact in 1988 the Force Commander was persona non grata on the Turkish-Cypriot side of the Green Line for several weeks as "punishment" for a perceived wrong-doing by members of the Force.

On 15 July 1974 the Cypriot National Guard, under Greek officers, staged a coup d'etat against the Makarios government. In a move to protect the lives of the Turkish-Cypriots and in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee, the Turks invaded Cyprus on 20 July, capturing the northern third of the island, as shown on the map at Annex C, before the final cease-fire was agreed to on 16

August. Nine UN peacekeepers were killed and over sixty were wounded by hostile fire during the fighting,²³ either attempting to arrange local cease-fires, protecting the lives of the Cypriots of both communities, defending Nicosia International Airport or remaining in their over-run observation posts initiating reports which would eventually reach the Secretary General.

UNFICYP is funded differently than the other peacekeeping forces. The \$31 million annual requirement is provided by voluntary contributions from member states and not from the general account. When nations that have committed themselves to provide funds do not do so, it is the peacekeeper on the "Green Line" who must make do without the tools needed to accomplish his mission. It is not uncommon for UNFICYP not to be able to provide a ten dollar item to an observation post because of a lack of available funds. Representatives of the former Soviet Union met with the author in 1989 with an offer to provide airlift, image-intensification observation devices and other equipment to UNFICYP; but the assistance was never forthcoming. The United States is millions of dollars in arrears in its promised contributions to UNFICYP. Neither of the two superpowers have contributed its share in funding this operation. UNFICYP continues to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and return to normal conditions both north and south of the Buffer Zone separating the government-controlled area from the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Although there are still several fatal shootings between the opposing forces each year, UNFICYP has prevented

further outbreak of war on the island, with the exception of the 1974 Turkish intervention, for 28 years. This international force was able to accomplish very quickly that which the power of British Forces Cyprus could not do in four years. Each day that goes by without a further outbreak of hostilities means UNFICYP has been successful in its peacekeeping role.²⁴

A question that has often been asked with regards to Cyprus is the degree to which UNFICYP is part of the problem. The armies of both sides have been separated, and in fact in 1989 the distance between the opposing forces in Nicosia was increased so that they could not even see each other. Prior to this increased separation the belligerents were as close as two metres apart in the Canadian Sector in Nicosia which gave rise to insults, garbage and bullets being fired across the Green Line. Now that they can no longer see one another, and assuming that they will continue to abide by the negotiated separation agreement, there is less likelihood of contact and therefore less urgency in solving the diplomatic problem. Should UNFICYP be withdrawn with six or twelve months notice so that both sides are forced to sit down at the negotiating table, or would this withdrawal only give one side the opportunity to force its wishes upon the other? An eternal question in Cyprus!

CASE THREE: UNEF II

As previously mentioned, the Middle East has a long history of war and invasion, and this paradigm was not broken after the creation of the state of Israel. The Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 were connected by almost continuous raids and retaliatory strikes; and the origins of one war could be found to a very considerable degree in the outcome of the previous one.¹⁵ Land was captured and lost; men, women and children were killed; and the Cold War was just as much a part of life here as it was in Central Europe. Both the United States and the Soviet Union provided arms and training, while the Soviets were directly involved in air and ground combat.

As the British forces withdrew from Palestine in May 1948, the neighboring states of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq and Lebanon invaded Palestine and attacked Jewish settlements in the newly-formed country of modern Israel. By the time the war was over on January 7, 1949, Israel had gained considerable new territory. In 1956, determined to maintain their concept of military parity in the area, Israel attacked the United Arab Republic forces in the Sinai Peninsula and advanced up to the Suez Canal. Modern Israel was born in war and was raised in conflict.

Israel captured the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the West Bank in only six days in June 1967 and then refused to return the occupied territories to the humiliated Arabs. Thus Egypt, Syria and Jordan lived in continual embarrassment in the Arab world; and this situation could not, in their eyes, be allowed

to continue.

The combined forces of Egypt and Syria attacked on October 6, 1973. This was Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, the most holy day in the Jewish religious calendar. After initial Arab successes, the Israelis counterattacked and were once again victorious, pushing to within striking distance of Damascus and Cairo. The Security Council, after passing a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, requested the Secretary General to despatch elements of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) to observe. The Military Observers from UNTSO were unable to persuade the belligerents to comply with the resolution; and on the initiative of non-aligned members of the UN, Secretary-General Waldheim was requested to form an United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II).

The mandate of the Force was to supervise, monitor and report; all tasks which could be completed with the troops available to the Force and without the use of firearms, except in self defence. The first troops to arrive were transferred from UNFICYP, and the Force was established under Finnish Major-General E. Siilasvuo, the former UNTSO Chief of Staff. Siilasvuo immediately arranged for a meeting between the Egyptians and Israelis at Kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez Road to discuss the cease-fire, the resupply of the surrounded Egyptian Third Army, and the evacuation of civilian wounded from the Suez City.

These talks at Kilometre 101, the Geneva Peace Conference and American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's tireless diplomatic

efforts resulted in the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagements of Forces which was signed at Kilometre 101 on January 19, 1974. This agreement established a zone of disengagement running from the Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf of Suez on the east side of the Canal as shown in Annex D. On each side of this zone were "limited armament and forces" zones, further reducing the number of troops and weapons in the area. The two sides were separated without incident, and UNEF II manned checkpoints and observation posts and conducted patrols in order to control the zone of disengagement. The UN had complete freedom of movement, except that the Poles were not allowed on Israeli soil, enabling the Force to easily accomplish its mission.

In 1975 Dr. Kissinger succeeded in further separating the two sides; and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, signed at Camp David in 1979, saw the complete Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai to the original international border east of El Arish. This ended the requirement for UNEF II, and its mandate lapsed in July 1979. Forty-seven members of the Force had given their lives on this operation, mainly in traffic accidents and mine-field incidents, in addition to nine Canadians who were shot down by a Syrian missile while flying from UNEF II to UNTSO.²⁶

CONCLUSION

Although all three conflicts in the case studies were conducted within a few hundred kilometres of each other, they typify all United Nations peacekeeping operations. While they are similar, they also differ. Some were successful and some were not; some led to diplomatic solutions, while others maintained a fragile cease-fire; and still others cost the lives of UN soldiers in their unsuccessful efforts to keep opposing forces apart. Determining what made some operations successful while others failed may assist future planners of peacekeeping missions in establishing the optimum situations for the employment of blue-bereted soldiers. There appear to be four major essential criteria for successful peacekeeping missions.

AGREEMENT AND COOPERATION OF BELLIGERENTS

The chance of success in Lebanon was in doubt from the start. The Israelis continue to carry out hostile acts in southern Lebanon and provide support to the Lebanese Christian forces in that area. The unwillingness of the Israeli government, for whatever reason, to comply with the Security Council resolutions passed between March 19, 1978 and the present has made the peacekeepers' tasks impossible. In fact, another Irish Contingent soldier was tragically killed in November 1991 in the search for a peaceful solution in Lebanon.

In Cyprus, disagreement between the Greeks and Turks and between the two Cypriot communities has been the norm.

Disagreement between President Makarios and the other participants in the 1964 London Conference on the composition of the peacekeeping force and the continued lack of agreement on the reunification of the island or the formal independence of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus are but two examples.

The Kilometre 101 cease-fire agreement and the Camp David Accord, which resulted in lasting peace between Israel and Egypt, constitute an example of cooperation at its finest. Contrary to the example set by Nasser when he evicted UNEF I in 1967, both Sadat and Begin had the vision of peaceful co-existence between their nations and were willing to sacrifice and compromise to reach that end.²⁷ Fortunately their successors have continued that noble commitment.

Both sides involved in a conflict must show this same willingness to compromise before a peacekeeping operation has a chance of success. For either party to be recalcitrant is a guarantee of failure for the peacekeepers. In Yugoslavia today the chance of a successful UN peacekeeping operation is slim; as Serbia has called for peacekeepers to separate ethnic groups on Croatian territory, but Croatia wants the UN force only on the official border between the republics.²⁸ The political will must exist on both sides of this conflict; and a compromise must be found before success is possible, a situation not present in Yugoslavia when Cyrus Vance visited that war-torn country on behalf of the Secretary General in December 1991²⁹. By January 1992 the political situation had softened and the way seemed open for the

employment of peacekeepers. The first United Nations soldiers arrived in the middle of January to set up the headquarters for a possible future force, but as this paper goes to print there is still no guarantee that the UN soldiers will be given an opportunity to keep the peace.

MANDATE

The wording of the United Nations mandate given the Force, like the wording of the task given to any military unit, has a great deal of influence on the success or failure of the United Nations peacekeepers. UNIFIL was tasked to "restore international peace" which, under the circumstances at the time, would require armed force to prevent any of the factions from carrying out hostile activities in the mission area. As armed force can be employed only in self-defence or to defend persons that the peacekeepers have been tasked to protect, this mandate was clearly unachievable.

UNFICYP's mandate was written using the terms "use its efforts to prevent" and "contribute to", while the UNEF II mandate was to supervise, monitor and report. These tasks are achievable without the use of armed force and rely less on the cooperation of the belligerents.

It is apparent that great care must be taken in the wording of the Security Council resolution and thus the mandate and task statement of the Force. If the tasks require the use of armed force should persuasion not work, then the outcome is highly

questionable. This requirement has obviously been understood by the United Nations, as the mandate for the United Nations Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) is to prevent further hostile activities "through their presence", to monitor and to observe. It has been recognized that no peacekeeping force could stop the Iraqi army, even one decimated by the coalition in 1991, should the Iraqis decide not to cooperate and take offensive action. Kuwait requested that the Force guard against smuggling and infiltration across its border with Iraq, but fortunately this request was denied. There is no provision in the Charter for the administration of national laws being delegated to a United Nations peacekeeping force.

The initial draft of the UNIKOM mandate saw the positioning of United Nations infantry battalions between the Iraqis and the Kuwaitis. This had, in the opinion of the civilian UN Secretariat, the most potential for success. The small military staff of five at United Nations Headquarters advised against an armed force and proposed an unarmed observer force. This advice was not accepted by the international civil servants; and only the financial situation in the organization forced the Security Council to direct that the Force be an observer mission, although infantry battalions from UNFICYP and UNIFIL have been placed on standby to assist the UNIKOM observers should the need arise. The military staff appears to have little credibility with the deployed forces, as it does not deal with the forces in the field; and it apparently has little credibility with its civilian masters in New York. The staff

conducts no contingency or crisis planning, as it is not politically possible to do so if the troop-contributors for any potential mission have not been identified.

An international military staff, fully manned by peacekeeping veterans and dealing with the Forces in the field would gain credibility with the deployed Forces and thus with the Security Council. Their valuable military advice would perhaps prevent errors in force structure or in the wording of the mandate, as nearly happened in UNIKOM.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

The ability of any military force to accomplish its task is directly related to the ability of the force to move in safety wherever it wishes. This applies equally to a United Nations peacekeeping force. The lack of this freedom in Lebanon and Cyprus has had detrimental effects on the success of the two Forces involved. A Force Commander who is not allowed to travel through one third of his area of responsibility and is not allowed to meet with the military and civilian leaders of one side of the conflict can hardly be expected to be successful in his mission.

Peacekeepers on UNEF II were able to travel throughout the mission area of operations with very few restrictions. Both the Israelis and the Egyptians cooperated with the Force in determining out-of-bounds areas, and the interests of all parties were served.

Unreasonable restrictions on the freedom of movement of all members of the Force must be overcome at the same time as the

security concerns of the belligerents must be met. Should initial freedom of movement be in question, the Secretary General must become personally involved in the negotiations; and if this freedom is withdrawn by one of the belligerents at a later date, again negotiations must take place at the highest level. Without freedom of movement, no peacekeeping force can succeed.

FINANCES

The amount of funding available to run a force also has considerable influence on the success of that force. The lack of funds to purchase surveillance equipment, such as unattended ground sensors and ground surveillance radars for UNFICYP, has meant that soldiers from both sides have been able to enter or cross the Buffer Zone unnoticed. These incursions have often resulted in fatal shootings and increased inter-communal tension.

The budget for a peacekeeping force must be appropriated from the general account of the United Nations; the generosity of troop-contributing nations must not be assumed. These nations are already contributing troops, transportation and other costs and should not be relied upon to provide the funds for the entire operation. At the end of 1991 the United States was \$140,900,000 in arrears in its peacekeeping contributions, the largest debtor in the world.¹⁰ When the stability of the world is at stake, the entire world should pay. With increased funds thus available, the tools needed by the peacekeepers could be made available.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Peacekeeping is a growth industry, and as this paper goes to press the United Nations is actively considering a peacekeeping mission in Cambodia and has small planning staffs in the Western Sahara and Yugoslavia for future operations in those countries. There are wars, civil wars, revolutions and intra-communal strife in many other parts of the world today where the "Blue Berets" could be called upon tomorrow to insert themselves between belligerents so that political and diplomatic efforts would have a stable base from which to work. It is incumbent upon the United Nations Organization and its member states to ensure that these peacekeepers have the best possible chance of stabilizing the military situation between the opposing forces.

Gaining the cooperation of the belligerents by persuasion, by bribery or by more drastic means if necessary is an absolute necessity for a successful peacekeeping operation. Without the agreement of both sides that a political or diplomatic solution is both desirable and necessary, there is no chance for peace; and to commit peacekeepers would only endanger these soldiers without any possibility that they could be successful.

Peacekeepers cannot and should not be put in the position where the use of firearms, except in self defence, is required. The task statement of the Force is based upon the mandate provided by the Secretary General, which in turn is based upon the resolution passed by the Security Council. This resolution must be worded so that the firearm restriction will not jeopardize

the mandate. Any peacekeeping force that requires the use of force to accomplish its task is doomed to failure. The advice of a competent, respected military staff at United Nations Headquarters would assist in ensuring that this mandate is properly worded. Terms such as "monitor", "to contribute", and "by assisting pragmatically" should be used, emphasizing that force will not be applied by the peacekeepers in the accomplishment of their mandate, as well as emphasizing that the cooperation of the opposing sides is an absolute necessity.

Without the ability to move freely within its mission area, the Force has no chance of being successful. Investigation of alleged violations of a cease-fire agreement, negotiation with both sides in a conflict, and the monitoring of the military situation in an area all require freedom of movement by all troops involved in the operation.

Peace is just as costly as war; it is simply a better buy for the dollar. Adequate money must be made available to fund the force in order to provide the equipment needed by the troops. The peacekeepers do not require top-of-the-line military equipment, but they do need the basics. All member nations must be involved in providing this financial support, and any future force should not have to rely only on the generosity of volunteer nations.

The soldiers and policemen from the various nations around the world which contribute troops to United Nations peacekeeping forces can and do stabilize unbalanced situations, giving the diplomats and politicians the opportunity to find peaceful resolution to the

conflict. A study of past peacekeeping missions - the successes and failures - will ensure that those who have to plan future missions or have to place troops wearing blue berets in harms way, can do so in such a way that those soldiers will have the best chance for success.

NOTES

1. A list of the twenty peacekeeping missions plus MINURSO which is a planning headquarters in Western Sahara for a future mission in that country is at Annex A.
2. The Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 16.
3. The Charter of the United Nations. Article 42.
4. Major-General Gunther G Greindl, Peacekeeping, Speech to the Canadian Institute for Peace and Security, Toronto, 1987.
5. General Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping, London: Hurst, 1984. pp. 1-2.
6. Major-General Clive Milner in a letter to the author from HQ UNFICYP, Nicosia dated October 8, 1991.
7. United Nations, The Blue Helmets, New York: United Nations Publication, 1985. p. 108.
8. John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989. p. 43.
9. Joachim Hutter, an executive in the office of the Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs in an interview by the author at United Nations Headquarters, New York, December 10, 1991.
10. Rikhye, op. cit. p. 101.
11. Mackinlay, op. cit. p. 45-46.
12. Marrack I. Goulding, in a speech to the US Army War College at United Nations Headquarters, New York, October 7, 1991.
13. Rikhye, op. cit. p. 105.
14. Charles C. Moskos, Peace Soldiers, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. p. 3.
15. Major-General Gunther G. Greindl, The Concept of Peacekeeping, Speech to the United Nations University, Tokyo, 1985.
16. United Nations, The Blue Helmets, New York: United Nations Publication, 1985. p. 139.

17. General George Grivas, The Memoirs of General Grivas, ed. Charles Foley, London: Longmans, 1964. p. 1.

18. Rikhye, op. cit. p. 90.

19. Brigadier Michael Harbottle, The Impartial Soldier, London: Oxford University, 1970. p. 11.

20. James Boyd, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Pattern and Prospects, Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1971. p. 68-69.

21. United Nations Charter, Article 103.

22. United Nations, op. cit. p. 265.

23. Moskos, op. cit. p. 145.

24. Milner, op. cit.

25. Major-General Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1975. p. 2.

26. Rikhye, op. cit. pp. 65-67.

27. The 1967 and 1973 wars may never have taken place had Israel agreed to UNEF I being stationed on its soil. When President Nasser evicted the Force from Egypt in June 1967, it had to where to redeploy and had to be disbanded.

28. "UN Cease-fire goes into Effect", The Sentinel, November 25, 1991, A3.

29. Cyrus Vance, in a statement at United Nations Headquarters, New York, December 10, 1991.


30. Paul Lewis, "U.N.'s Fund Crisis Worsens as Role in Security Rises." New York Times January 27, 1992, A8.


UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS1947 TO PRESENT

Force	Timeframe	Location
<u>Observer Operations</u>		
UNSCOB	1947-54	Balkans
UNTSO	1948-present	Israel
UNMOGIP	1949-present	India/Pakistan
UNOGIL	1958-59	Lebanon
UNTEA	1962-63	West Irian
UNYOM	1963-64	Yemen
DOMREP	1965	Dominican Republic
UNGOMAP	1988-90	Afghanistan
UNIIMOG	1988-present	Iran/Iraq
ONUCA	1989-present	Central America
UNAVEM	1989-91	Angola
UNTAG	1989-90	Namibia
UNIKOM	1991-present	Iraq/Kuwait
<u>Peacekeeping Operations</u>		
UNEF I	1956-67	Egypt
ONUC	1960-64	Congo
UNFICYP	1964-present	Cyprus
UNIPOM	1965-66	India Pakistan
UNDOF	1974-present	Golan Heights
UNEF II	1974-79	Egypt


UNIFIL	1978-present	Lebanon
MINURSO	1991 (planning staff)	Western Sahara

UNIFIL MISSION AREA 1985



UNFICYP MISSION AREA POST 1974

UNEF II MISSION AREA 1979



BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Boyd, James M. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Pattern and Prospects. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1971.

Burns, A.L. and Heathcote, Nina. Peacekeeping by United Nations Forces. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

Frydenberg, Per. Peace-Keeping Experience and Evaluation - The Oslo Papers. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1964.

Grivas, General George. The Memoirs of General Grivas. Ed. Charles Foley. London: Longmans, 1964.

Harbottle, Brigadier Michael. The Impartial Soldier. London: Oxford University, 1970.

Herzog, Major-General Chaim. The War of Atonement. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975.

Keller, Peter, et al. Insight on the Middle East War. London: Andre Deutsch, 1974.

League of Nations Covenant. Geneva: 1927.

MacKinlay, John. The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989.

Mathews, David. The Cyprus Tapes. London: Rustom and Brother, 1987.

Moskos, Charles C. Jr. Peace Soldiers. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976.

Oberling, Pierre. The Road to Bellapais. Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1982.

Rikhye, General Indar Jit. The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping. London: Hurst, 1984.

Sherman, Arnold. When God Judged and Men Died. Toronto: Bantam, 1973.

Taylor, Alastair. "Peacekeeping: The International Context". Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968. pp. 1-40.

United Nations Charter

United Nations. Department of Public Information. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping. New York: United Nations Publication, 1985.

PERIODICALS/PAPERS

Allan, Colonel James H. "Peacekeeping in the Persian Gulf". Military Review 71.8 (1991) pp. 56-63.

Boulden, Jane. Building on the Past: Future Directions for Peacekeeping. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 1991.

Cox, David. "Canada's Interest in Peacekeeping". Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968. pp. 41-62.

Harries, Colonel J. David. "Peacekeeping Futures". Canadian Defence Quarterly October 1991. pp. 25-31.

Hepburn, Robert. "Green Line Blues". Legion 66.1 (1991). pp. 18-19.

Hillmer, Norman. "Peacemakers, Blessed and Otherwise". Canadian Defence Quarterly 19.1 (1989). pp. 55-58.

Jones, Peter. Peacekeeping and the Persian Gulf Crisis: A Historical Review. Arms Control and Disarmament Division, External Affairs and International Trade Canada. Ottawa: February, 1991.

Keashly, Loraleigh and Fisher, Ronald J. Toward a Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention. Regina: University of Saskatchewan. 1988.

Leslie, Lieutenant-Colonel David S. and Elms, Major R.G. "United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Lessons from a Peacekeeping Experience". Canadian Defence Quarterly 19.1 (1989). pp. 51-54.

Lewis, Paul. "U.N.'s Fund Crisis Worsens as Role in Security Rises". New York Times January 27, 1992. pp. A1, A8.

MacInnis, Major-General John A. "Cyprus - Canada's Perpetual Vigil". Canadian Defence Quarterly 19.1 (1989). pp. 21-26.

Manson, General Paul D. "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy". Canadian Defence Quarterly 19.1 (1989). pp. 7-12.

Morrison, Lieutenant-Colonel Alex. "The Renaissance of United Nations Peacekeeping: Some Observations from New York". Canadian Defence Quarterly 19.1 (1989). pp. 13-17.

Porter, Lieutenant-Colonel William H. "United Nations Emergency Force II". Canadian Defence Quarterly 19.1 (1989). pp. 48-49.

"UN Cease-fire goes into Effect". The Sentinel, Carlisle: 25 November 1991, p. A3.

Vayrynen, Raimo. "Third Parties in the Resolution of Regional Conflicts". Bulletin of Peace Proposals 18.3 (1987). Norwegian University Press. pp. 293-308.

Wiseman, Henry. Peacekeeping and the Management of International Conflict. Toronto: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. September, 1987.

Yuill, Brigadier-General W.A.D. "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force". Canadian Defence Quarterly 19.1 (1989). pp. 28-33.

SPEECHES

Goulding, Marrack I. Peacekeeping. Speech to the US Army War College at United Nations Headquarters, New York, October 7, 1991.

. The Changing Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peace-Keeping. Speech to DPI/IPS Symposium, Singapore, March 13, 1991.

Greindl, Major-General Gunther G. The Concept of Peacekeeping. Speech to the United Nations University, Tokyo, September, 1985.

. Peacekeeping. Speech to Canadian Institute for Peace and Security, Toronto, 1987.

. Peacekeeping and Peacemaking, the Need for Patience. Speech to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the International Peace Academy, Oslo, December 12, 1988.

Holst, Minister of Defence Johan Jorgen. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Common Security. Speech to Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony, Oslo, December 11, 1988.

Kirsch, Ambassador Phillippe. Peacekeeping Operations, The United Nations Perspective. Speech to Nordic Ministers of Defence, Trondheim, Norway, November 13, 1989.

Macintosh, James. Confidence Building: Its Contribution to Peacekeeping. Speech to York University Symposium on Peacekeeping. Toronto, November 7-9, 1989.

INTERVIEWS/LETTERS

Hutter, Joachim. Interview by author at United Nations Headquarters, New York, December 10, 1991.

Milner, Major-General Clive. Personal letter to author dated Nicosia, Cyprus, October 8, 1991.

Vance, Cyrus. a statement at United Nations Headquarters, New York, 10 December 1991.